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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview of the Rules
In June 1992 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) an-
nounced proposed amendments to rules regarding disclosure of com-
pensation paid or awarded to senior executives.1 With several
significant modifications, the proposals were approved in October
1992.2 The new rules apply to proxy statements, periodic reports and
other filings under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and to regis-
tration statements under the Securities Act of 1933.3
In essence, the new rules consolidate the required compensation
disclosure in a series of tables setting forth the compensatory ele-
ments for a particular year.4 The general descriptions of compensa-
tion plans prescribed under the old rules are no longer required.5 The
SEC also enacted several other provisions in an effort to further in-
form shareholders about executive compensation. These provisions
include a report by the board compensation committee (or the board
of directors) on the bases for its compensation decisions with respect
to certain executives and the relationship of such compensation to cor-
porate performance. 6 In addition, the new rules require a line graph
comparing the cumulative return on the company's common stock
with the return on both a broad market index such as the Standard
and Poor's 500 (S&P 500), and an industry or a peer group index.7
B. Basic Intent/Goals of Rules
According to SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, the changes to the
disclosure rules were necessary because current disclosure in the ex-
ecutive compensation area was an "impenetrable, legalistic narra-
1. Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6940, Exchange
Act Release No. 30,851, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,003
(June 23, 1992)[hereinafter Proposed Rules].
2. Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992)(to be codified at
17 CFR §§ 228-29, 240, 249)[hereinafter Final Rules or described by Item].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,853.
6. Item 402(k) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157.
7. Item 402(1) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157.
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tive."s Because many shareholders did not understand this narrative,
the old proxy system insulated management from accountability to
shareholders. 9 The stated purpose of the new rules is to "provide
shareholders with a clear and concise presentation of compensation
paid or awarded to executive officers, and the directors' bases for mak-
ing such compensation decisions."' 0 Similarly, the SEC maintains that
the goals of the rules are to "assure that shareholders are well in-
formed and that all the facts regarding the compensation that the
shareholders are paying are out in the open, and to foster better ac-
countability of the board of directors to the shareholders.""1 Whether
the new rules will achieve their stated objectives is considered
throughout this Article.
The new rules do not dictate the amount or the structure of execu-
tive compensation. Rather, they concentrate on improving disclosure
of compensation information to shareholders, regardless of what that
information is. The SEC recognizes that the appropriate amount and
structure of compensation for corporate employees is a question that
should be resolved in the private marketplace, not by government reg-
ulation.12 If market participants are to make appropriate decisions,
however, they must have access to all pertinent information. It is the
goal of the rules not only to help provide shareholders with that ac-
cess, but also to make that information easier to understand and more
relevant to proxy voting and investment decisions.13 Thus, the
changes to the rules are designed to enhance the workings of market
forces with respect to executive pay.14
It is interesting to consider whether the SEC has in fact molded the
rules to allow the market to dictate the level and structure of execu-
tive compensation. Has the SEC inadvertently (or advertently) cre-
ated a bias in favor of or against certain forms of compensation? This
8. SECAdopts Proxy Reform Package After Long Study and Intense Debate, Sec. L.
Daily (BNA)(Oct. 16, 1992).
9. Id.
10. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,852-53.
11. Id. at 82,853.
12. Richard C. Breeden, Chairman of the SEC, press release (Feb. 13, 1992). See also
Richard C. Breeden, Chairman of the SEC, Proxy Rules and Executive Compen-
sation 4 (June 23, 1992)(opening remarks)(transcript available at the Commis-
sion)("Ultimately, compensation decisions must be made in the private
marketplace.").
Similarly, Commissioner Schapiro stated that "the proposals will not and
should not stray from [the Commission's] belief that the federal securities laws
and the Commission itself have no place in setting the appropriate level of execu-
tive salaries." Commissioner Mary L. Schapiro, Remarks Before the Council of
Institutional Investors 2 (Apr. 9, 1992)(transcript available at the Commission).
13. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,853.
14. Id. See infra subsection I.D.2. for a discussion of other SEC action in this area.
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issue will be revisited below as the various components of the new
disclosure scheme are analyzed.
C. Conditions Which Led to the Change
1. Increasing Use of Long-Term Compensation Arrangements
The compensation disclosure requirements which the new rules re-
placed were adopted approximately ten years ago. Three relevant fac-
tors have changed since then. First, the structure of executive
compensation packages has changed significantly over the last dec-
ade.15 Second, shareholder activism has increased.6 Finally, public
sentiment regarding executive pay has become increasingly nega-
tive.17 These three changes provided the impetus for changing the ex-
ecutive compensation disclosure rules.
The structure of executive pay packages has evolved over the last
decade to include more long-term compensation provisions.' 8 The in-
crease in the use of long-term compensation can be accredited to the
belief that such compensation arrangements provide management
with incentives to create shareholder value.19 Arguably, real owner-
ship by executives "builds commitment and risk on the part of execu-
tives and positively influences long-term decisionmaking." 20
The increasing emphasis placed on long-term incentive compensa-
tion indicated the need for change to the old disclosure rules. Accord-
ing to one survey, base salary constituted 35% of compensation
packages and long-term incentive compensation constituted 31% of to-
tal compensation reported for executives among surveyed companies
in 1991.21 In 1985, base salary constituted 52% of compensation pack-
ages and long-term compensation constituted only 8% of such compen-
sation.22 Stock options are the principal form of long-term incentive
15. See infra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
18. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,853 (citing Louis J. Brindisi, Executive Com-
pensation Links to Shareholder Value Creation, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: A
STRATEGIC GUIDE FOR THE 1990's 273 (Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1991)). See also infra
notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
19. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,853.
20. Id- (citing FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., INC., LONG TERM INCENTIVE GRANTS
AMONG THE ToP 200 INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES (Nov. 1991)).
21. Geoffery Colvin, How to Pay the CEO Right, FORTUNE, Apr. 6, 1992, at 62. The
other components of compensation in 1991 were annual incentive, 22%; benefits,
11%; and perquisites, 1%. The study surveyed 282 large to medium-size industrial
companies. Id.
22. Id. The other components of compensation in 1985 were annual incentive, 22%;
benefits, 16%; and perquisites, 2%. Id.
A survey of fifty large industrial companies reported that executive compen-
sation packages in 1991 consisted of base salary, 33%; long-term incentives, 36%;
bonus, 18%; benefits, 10%; and perquisites, 3%. Changes in the Executive Corn-
[Vol. 72:803
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compensation being used. One study reported that more than 90% of
the companies it analyzed offered stock options as the main form of
long-term incentive compensation.23
Executive pay packages have grown increasingly complex as the
use of long-term incentive compensation has increased. According to
the SEC, many shareholders now find the reporting of compensation
"incomprehensible." 24 Current compensation schemes are buried in
pages of opaque proxy-speak.25 Even sophisticated financial newspa-
pers sometimes have difficulty determining exactly what executives
are paid. For example, in 1991, the Wall Street Journal reported that
the salary of ITT CEO Rand Araskog had increased to $7.3 million.26
One month later, the Journal explained that Araskog's salary had ac-
tually risen to $11.4 million.27 To determine Araskog's pay, the Jour-
nal had to examine 19 dense pages of the company's proxy
statement. 28 In short, company descriptions of compensation packages
through the narratives required under the prior disclosure rules have
become unwieldy.
2. Institutional Investors and Shareholder Activism
Also affecting executive compensation are the increases in institu-
tional investors and shareholder activism. Stockholders are becoming
more active in corporate governance matters (perhaps out of necessity
because information is in fact "incomprehensible") and are increas-
ingly demanding reforms regarding communication and disclosure.29
A major reason shareholders are becoming more active is because in-
stitutional investors 30 are holding an increasing amount of equity. In-
pensation Mix, J. OF Acer., May 1992, at 18. Compensation in 1987 consisted of
base salary, 39%; long-term incentives, 27%; bonus, 18%; benefits, 13%; and per-
quisites, 3%. Id.
23. FREDERIC W. COOK & Co., INC., LONG-TERM INCENTIVE COMPENSATION GRANTS
AMONG THE SERVICE 200 2 (1991); FREDERIC W. COOK & Co., INC., supra note 20,
at 2.
24. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,854.
"A good deal of the skepticism over pay results from the public's inability to
understand it. Many companies have contributed to the problem by making the
proxy statement an exercise in obfuscation." Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Mar. 30,
1992, at 55. According to Jerry K. Pearlman, Chairman of Zenith Electronics
Corp., "[the growth in long-term compensation was largely because it was far
less disclosed and certainly far less understandable." Id. at 55-56.
25. Nell Minow & Kit Bingham, Executive Pay: Investors Care, LEGAL TIMEs, Sept.
28, 1992, at 22, 25.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
30. The term institutional investor generally includes pension funds, mutual funds,
insurance companies, bank managed trusts, and foundation and endowment
funds.
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stitutional investors controlled 23% of the equity capital of U.S.
corporations in 1955.31 That percentage grew to 38% by 1981.32 In
1990, institutional investors controlled more than 53% of such capi-
tal.33  As institutional investors increase their control over the eq-
uity of corporations, they are becoming more active in corporate
governance. The number of corporate governance shareholder resolu-
tions has risen sharply. In 1990, there were 294 such resolutions, while
there were just 55 resolutions in 1986.34 During the same period, the
number of shareholder resolutions on executive compensation and
benefits issues rose from 35 to 110.35 Shareholder resolutions on exec-
utive compensation were supported by an average of 20.7% of the
shares voted at 1992 annual meetings (shareholders have also submit-
ted such resolutions to several other companies whose 1992 annual
meetings were to be held later in the year).36
Without the increase in shareholder activism, primarily through
institutional investors, the impetus for change in the disclosure rules
might not have occurred.37 Large investor motivation was necessary
because individual investors lack the incentive to push for change re-
garding executive compensation. Additionally, the costs to small
shareholders of taking action in this area outweigh any benefits which
they might obtain.38
3. Negative Publicity
The third factor underlying the new rules is the growing public
31. Shareholder Rights: The Role of the Federal Proxy Regulatory System, 1991:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1991)(statement of
Richard Breeden, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission).
32. C. BRANCATO & P. GAUGHAN, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CAPITAL MARKETS:
1991 UPDATE table 10 (Colum. L. Sch. Institutional Investor Project, Sept. 12,
1991).
33. Id.
34. Shareholder Rights: The Role of the Federal Proxy Regulatory System, 1991, supra
note 31.
35. Patrick McGurn & Ann Yerger, SEC Allows Shareholder Votes on Executive
Compensation, IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL., Jan./Feb. 1992, at 3.
36. Pay Proposals Debut Receive Mixed Reviews, IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL.,
May/June 1992, at 7. More pay related proposals are expected in 1993, which will
be the first full proxy season for the SEC's new policy regarding shareholder
proposals on executive compensation. IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. 40 Sept.
11, 1992, at 1.
See infra subsection I.D.2. for a discussion of the SEC's decision to allow
shareholder proposals on executive pay.
37. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive-Pay Disclosure: Who Listens?,
LEGAL TiMEs, Aug. 10, 1992, at 22. (SEC developed new disclosure rules after
being pressured by Congress, institutional investors, and self-appointed share-
holder spokespersons.)
38. See, e.g., ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 390-394 (1986).
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concern over the amount of executive pay. For example, presidential
candidates, shareholder groups, and the media have criticized execu-
tive pay.39 Fortune, Business Week, and The Wall Street Journal have
devoted considerable negative attention to the subject.40 Critics point
to examples such as comparisons of CEO pay with nonexecutive
worker pay or with non-U.S. executive pay to argue their point that
executives are overpaid.41 Critics also complain that executive pay in-
creases regardless of company performance.42
D. Other Government Action in the Executive Pay Arena
1. Congressional Action
Several bills have been introduced in Congress that could affect
the levels and structure of executive pay. The Income Disparities Act
of 199143 proposed limiting corporate tax deductions for executive pay
to 25 times that paid to the company's lowest paid, full-time employee.
The Corporate Pay Responsibility Act44 would have permitted stock-
holders to include proposals in proxy statements soliciting advisory
votes on compensation matters. The bill also would have required ad-
ditional disclosure of executive pay in annual proxy statements, in-
cluding a single dollar figure representing total compensation, an
estimate of the present value of future compensation and a graphic
comparison of past and anticipated future compensation. Neither bill
has passed. The Corporate Pay Responsibility Act is unlikely to ad-
39. Amanda Bennett, A Little Pain and a Lot to Gain, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1992, at
R1.
40. See Colvin, supra note 21; Executive Pay, supra note 24; John A. Byrne, What,
Me Overpaid? CEO's Fight Back, Bus. WK., May 4,1992, at 142; Amanda Bennett,
Voices of Protest, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1992, at R6.
41. The average total compensation of U.S. CEOs was $1.95 million in 1990, compared
with $190,000 in 1960. Shareholder Rights: The Role of the Federal Proxy Regula-
tory System, 1991, supra note 31, at 16. In contrast, the average factory worker
earned $23,000 in 1990, and approximately $18,000 in 1960. Id.
The CEO of an American manufacturing company typically earns twice the
total pay of a foreign CEO, and the gap may be larger in companies with annual
sales in excess of $250 million. TowERS PERRIN, 1990 EXECUTIVE PAY UPDATE:
WORLDWIDE TOTAL REMUNERATION (1990).
One critic of executive compensation maintains that "where [a] typical CEO
earned total compensation (excluding perquisites and fringe benefits) that was
around 35 times the pay of an average manufacturing worker in 1974, a typical
CEO today earns pay that is around 120 times that of an average manufacturing
worker and about 150 times that of the average worker in both manufacturing
and service industries." GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExcESS: THE OVER-
COMPENSATION OF ANERICAN EXECUTIVES 27 (1991).
42. James E. Ellis, You Don't Necessarily Get What You Pay For, Bus. Wx., May 4,
1992, at 144.
43. H.R. 3056, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
44. S. 1198, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
1993]
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vance since its provisions have been essentially duplicated by the SEC
in its recent activities.
2. Other SEC Action
In addition to the new executive pay disclosure rules, the SEC has
taken action in several other areas which affect executive pay. Re-
cently, the SEC has begun to require companies to include share-
holder proposals on executive compensation submitted pursuant to
Rule 14a-8 in their proxy statements.45 Historically, shareholder pro-
posals on executive pay were prohibited by the SEC on the basis that
such proposals constituted unjustified shareholder interference with
the ordinary business of corporations under state law.46 Although the
resolutions are only advisory in nature, they do allow shareholders to
provide direct input to the board on its compensation decisions.47
When the SEC approved the rule changes regarding executive
compensation disclosure, it also approved rule changes designed to al-
low shareholders to communicate with each other more easily about
corporate voting matters.48 Generally, the reformed shareholder com-
munication rules provide an exemption from proxy solicitation re-
quirements for communications to shareholders from any person who
is not seeking proxy authority or does not have a special interest in the
issue being put to shareholders for a vote.49
Without the SEC's change of position on these issues, shareholders
would have been limited regarding actions they could take to change
the level and structure of compensation plans. Once shareholders get
a clearer picture of a company's pay scheme, which the new disclosure
rules are designed to provide, a means of voicing their concein and
having input into the compensation decisions is necessary. Allowing
shareholders to propose executive compensation resolutions and facili-
tating shareholder communication help to provide such a means.
II. TABULAR AND GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF
COMPENSATION-RELATED INFORMATION
A. Overview of New Presentation
The proposed rules took the idea of tabular disclosure to an ex-
treme. Approximately a dozen tables and a line graph were required
under the proposed rules. The SEC's goal of providing clear and con-
45. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,853. See also SECAllows Shareholder Votes on
Executive Compensation, IRRC CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL., Jan./Feb. 1992, at 1.
46. Id. at 3.
47. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,853.
48. SEC Adopts Proxy Reform Package After Long Study and Intense Debate, supra
note 8.
49. Id.
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cise disclosure50 could not have been achieved under such a
framework.
The rules as finally enacted reduced the maximum number of re-
quired tables to seven. The four main tables required by the final
rules are:
- A summary compensation table disclosing compensation of the
company's chief executive officer and its four other most highly com-
pensated executives for the last three years (Table A);
- Two tables detailing options and stock appreciation rights
(SARs) for the above named executives (Tables B and C); and
- A long-term incentive plan award (LTIP) table (Table D).
The summary compensation table shows both annual and long-
term compensation in a single comprehensive table. It is essentially
the linchpin of the new disclosure scheme.5 1 Other required tables
include a pension plan table and an option/SAR repricing report. For
companies that solicit shareholder action with respect to a compensa-
tion plan, tabular disclosure of the benefits that will be received by or
allocated to certain executives under the plan must be made. The cor-
poration is not required to disclose information on plans not subject to
a vote.5 2
TABLE A
SUMMARY COMPENSATION TABLE
Annual Compensation Long Te compensation
Name and Odeit Aards Payouts All other
cncipsa-Year stock () B ( ops ct
on (s) award(s) (S) payouts ($)
(a) (b) c) (d) (e) (Q (g) (h) 0)
CEO
AM
B
50. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
51. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,129.
52. Id at 48,143.
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TABLE B
OPTION/SAR GRANTS IN LAST FISCAL YEAR
[Individual Grants]
Percent of
Opton,/SARs total options/ Exercise orSAts granted base pric ($ Expationgranted C#) to employees Sh) date
in fiscal year
Ca) (b) (c) (Cd) (a)
CEO ...............................................................................................
......................... .. ........
B.............. .................C............. 
..............D ............................................................................................ 
.
TABLE C
AGGREGATED OPTION/SAR EXERCISES IN LAST FISCAL YEAR AND FY-END OPTION/SAR VALUES
Number of Value of
Shares unexercised unexercised
Name acquired on Value realized optionslSARs oi oney
exercise (#) C$) at FY-end (#) at W-end(S)exercisable/ eecsbe
unexercisable exercisabtelunexercisabe
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
CEO ................................................................................................
A....................................................................
B....................................................................
C; ...................................................................
D . ........................................................
TABLE D
LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLANS-AWARDS IN LAST FISCAL YEAR
(c) Estimated Future Payouts under Non-Stock(b) Number of Performance Price-Based Plans
(a) Name shares, units or other
or other rights period until
#) maturation or (d) Threshold (e) Tarat (S (I) Maximum
payout ($ or #) o ) CS or #)
CEO
A
B
C
D
The reduction in the number of required tables is attributable to
several factors. First, information in several tables was often duplica-
tive and because of the duplication, was potentially misleading.5 3 For
example, in the proposed rules, nine tables required some disclosure
concerning stock options and SARs. Some shareholders might con-
sider such compensation suspect when it receives disproportionate dis-
53. Id. at 48,127.
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closure treatment. With such extensive coverage and emphasis on
options and SARs, shareholders might have inferred that options and
SARs are not in their best interests.54 However, as discussed earlier,
many people argue that long-term incentive compensation devices
such as options and SARs are beneficial to shareholders because they
align the interests of management with those of shareholders.55
Redundant disclosure also could have resulted in unsophisticated
shareholders misinterpreting information and mistakenly believing
that executives are receiving more pay than they actually are. For
instance, if an item of compensation is disclosed in more than one ta-
ble, a shareholder might "double-count" the item. The rules as finally
enacted appear to remedy these problems through reduction of the
amount of duplicative information and the number of required tables.
Another reason the number of tables was reduced is that portions
of several tables were of little utility to shareholders. For example,
the proposed disclosure of compensation of all executive officers as a
group was deleted.56 In several cases, the pertinent information in
these tables was streamlined and combined with the information in
other tables to form a more concise disclosure scheme. For example,
the proposed option/SAR summary report that detailed the nature
and extent of the company's use of options was deleted, and a new
column was added to the option/SAR grant table (Table B) to reflect
the percent of total options and SARs which were granted to the
named executives.5 7
The issue of which executives' pay information must be disclosed is
of paramount importance. If the information disclosed is not repre-
sentative of the company's pay practices, the rules fail to achieve their
purpose from the outset. The final rules provide that the persons sub-
ject to individualized disclosure in each of the required tables include
the CEO,58 regardless of the amount of pay, and the company's four
other most highly compensated executive officers.59 However, if the
"other" officers earned salary and bonuses6 O not exceeding $100,000
for the last completed fiscal year, disclosure is not required.61 Fur-
54. Comment Letter from Ronald F. Daitz, Chairman, New York State Bar Associa-
tion to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission 2
(Aug. 28, 1992)(on file with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion)[Hereinafter NYSBA Letter].
55. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
56. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,127.
57. Id at 48,134.
58. The term CEO includes any individual acting in a capacity similar to that of Chief
Executive Officer. Item 402(a)(2)(i) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,145.
59. Id.
60. As defined in Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(A) and (B) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2 at
48,146.
61. Instruction 1 to Item 402(a)(2) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,145.
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ther, the determination of the most highly compensated executive of-
ficers is made by reference to total annual salary and bonus for the
last fiscal year.62
The SEC decision to focus solely on the previous year's salary and
bonus to determine the four other most highly compensated execu-
tives appears to be inconsistent with the SEC's statements concerning
the goals of the rules and the need for these rules. As mentioned ear-
lier, one of the Commission's goals was to assure "that shareholders
are well informed and that all the facts regarding the compensation
that the shareholders are paying are out in the open."6 3 However, be-
cause the determination of the executives to be included is based
solely on salary and bonus, there is a risk that shareholders will not be
well informed. If an executive receives a small salary and bonus, but a
large amount of long-term compensation, he might not meet the SEC's
narrow definition of the company's four other most highly compen-
sated executives because long-term compensation is totally ignored in
making the determination. Yet this executive's total compensation
package could be one of the four highest in the company.
The SEC's decision appears even more dubious when one considers
its stated justification for the new rules. The SEC enacted the new
rules because the old rules did not report long-term compensation ar-
rangements clearly and concisely.64 To explain the importance of
clearly reporting these long-term arrangements, the SEC stated that
long-term incentive compensation has overtaken the more traditional
fixed salary and bonus to become the largest single component of the
typical executive's pay.6 5 Thus, the foundation of the new rules is
based on the form of compensation (salary and bonus) which cur-
rently makes up a minority portion of the typical executive's pay, com-
pletely ignoring the form of compensation (long-term compensation)
which led to the new rules!
It will not matter that long-term compensation is not included in
determining the four other most highly compensated executives if the
executives who receive the largest salary and bonus likewise receive
the largest total compensation package. However, a company might
arrange its pay packages so that its "highest" executives receive a
large long-term component but a salary and bonus component lower
than that of other executives.66 Similarly, a company could limit an
executive's salary and bonus to $100,000 or less, but pay him considera-
62. Id
63. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,853. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 18 and 24 and accompanying text.
65. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,854 (citing W. James, Reality and Perception
of Executive Compensation, in PERFORMANCE AND COMPENSATION: AN ISSUE OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 82-83, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management,
Northwestern University, Jan. 13, 1992).
66. An issue raised by this approach is whether the failure to disclose such a strategy
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bly more in long-term compensation and avoid disclosure of his pay
package. The SEC did reduce a company's opportunity to manipulate
the rules by providing that if an executive receives non-cash compen-
sation in lieu of earned salary and bonus, such amounts must be in-
cluded when calculating whether the executive is among the most
highly compensated and when calculating whether an executive's an-
nual salary and bonus exceed the $100,000 threshold for disclosure.6 7
Although the SEC's approach to determining the other four most
highly compensated executives has the benefit of simplicity, several
alternative approaches were available. One obvious alternative would
have been simply to require registrants to make their determinations
based on a summation of the monetary elements of the summary com-
pensation table.68 The cost added by such an approach should be mini-
mal, while the benefits from the elimination of the risk of misleading
information would be substantial. This approach avoids the situation
where an executive with a high total compensation package is not in-
cluded simply because the salary and bonus components of the pack-
age are lower than four of the company's other executives.
Another possible approach in determining which executives to in-
clude is to consider all the monetary elements of the summary table
plus a valuation of option and SAR grants in the last fiscal year in the
calculations.69 This approach would most accurately reflect a com-
pany's total pay practices. Admittedly, this approach would be more
costly to the disclosing company because it would have to value option
and SAR grants for numerous executives to determine who to include
in the report. However, these costs should not be burdensome because
the company should already have some idea of the value of option and
SAR awards from its initial determination of the appropriate number
of such shares to award.70
in the proxy statement constitutes the omission of facts necessary to make the
facts disclosed not misleading resulting in a violation of Rule 10b-5.
67. Instruction 3 to Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(A) and (B) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at
48,146; Instruction I to Item 402(a)(2) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,145.
68. Such an approach would require the following elements of the summary compen-
sation table to be included: salary; bonus; "other annual compensation"; re-
stricted stock awards; LTIP payouts; and "all other compensation." Note that the
only element of the table not included would be the number of options and SARs
awards. See infra Part III. for a discussion of the summary compensation table.
69. In the option/SAR grant table, a company has the choice of reporting either the
grant-date option/SAR value or the potential realizable value of the option/SAR.
See infra note 137 and accompanying text. The value determined under the
method selected by the company would be added to the other elements of the
summary table to determine which executives to include.
70. Although companies might not value option and SAR grants in the manner the
SEC requires, their valuations would serve to reduce the number of individuals
whose grants must be valued for comparison purposes.
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B. Tabular Disclosure Versus Narrative Description
Under the previous compensation disclosure rules, compensation
packages were presented mainly through narrative descriptions.71 Ar-
guably, these descriptions became too confusing and complicated as
the forms of compensation expanded in number and complexity.72
Disclosure under the new rules, in contrast, is designed to be more
clear and concise. Although the tabular presentation facilitates share-
holder understanding of compensation, narrative disclosure is still
necessary and required where information is not amenable to tabular
presentation. For example, a narrative form is needed to effectively
explain employment agreements which include "golden parachute"
payments contingent on the executive's termination.73 Footnote nar-
rative disclosure is required regarding the vesting terms for restricted
stock awards that provide for vesting of all or part of the shares
awarded in less than three years from the date of grant.74
Company-specific intricacies in compensation arrangements and
practices threaten the SEC's goal of clear and concise disclosure.7 5
These factors require detailed disclosure which would be relegated to
footnote or other narrative disclosure, and companies may find it diffi-
cult to provide such disclosure in a clear, concise manner.76
Although the proliferation of footnotes has been criticized as too
confusing, the information they disclose is essential to a complete un-
derstanding of the compensation picture. Certainly, tables which
clearly and concisely set out basic compensation, coupled with foot-
note disclosure of other more specific, pertinent information, are more
valuable to shareholders than total narration.
III. SUMMARY COMPENSATION TABLE
A. Generally
Probably the single most important component of the new corn-
71. A cash compensation table was also required. Former Item 402(a) of Regulation
S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(1)(1992). See Also Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at
82,855.
72. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
73. Comment Letter from Ralph V. Whitworth, President, United Shareholders As-
sociation to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission 1
(Aug. 31, 1992)(on file with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion) [hereinafter USA Letter].
74. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,132. Footnote disclosure is required in this situa-
tion because restrictions on full ownership of restricted shares typically lapse
over a period of at least three to five years. Id.
75. See, e.g., supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
76. Comment Letter from John F. Olson, Chair, Federal Regulation of Securities
Committee, et al., American Bar Association to Jonathon G. Katz, Secretary, Se-
curities and Exchange Commission 19 (Aug. 31, 1992)(on file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission)[hereinafter ABA Letter].
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pensation disclosure scheme is the summary compensation table (Ta-
ble A).77 The summary compensation table is a concise overview of
compensation awarded, earned or paid78 to a company's CEO and its
four other most highly compensated executives for each of the preced-
ing three years.79 The table requires disclosure of all forms of execu-
tive compensation paid by the registrant, whether pursuant to a plan
or otherwise or through a third party.8s
The summary compensation table is intended to give shareholders
a clear understanding of compensation for the last completed fiscal
years' and to help shareholders identify trends in the company's pay
of management.8 2 These trends can then be compared to those of
other companies in an effort to determine whether current compensa-
tion diverges from market norms.8 3 Many shareholders are likely to
focus on the summary compensation table because, as the name im-
plies, it is a "summary" of all compensation. Therefore, it is important
that the table portray executive compensation as accurately as
possible.
B. Specific Elements
1. Salary and Bonus
The dollar values of base salary and annual bonus, whether denom-
inated as cash or noncash,8 4 are to be set out in separate columns of
the summary compensation table.85 Salary or bonus earned for serv-
ices performed, but deferred at the election of the executive, are re-
ported as annual compensation.6 Awards of noncash compensation
made to an executive in lieu of salary or bonus must be disclosed
where these awards are otherwise required to be reported in the sum-
mary compensation table.87
Various types of bonuses exist. Some bonuses are performance
sensitive, while other bonuses simply represent a percentage of salary.
Bonus criteria can be disclosed in the board compensation committee
77. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,855. The table replaces the cash compensation
table previously required. Id.
78. The year in which compensation is reported in the table is subject to rules which
vary for each form of compensation.
79. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,854; Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,129.
80. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,855.
81. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,129.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. For stock or any other form of noncash compensation, the fair market value at
the time the compensation is awarded, earned, or paid must be disclosed. Instruc-
tion 2 to Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(A) and (B), supra note 1, at 48,146.
85. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,130.
86. Id. at 48,131.
87. Id,
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report.88 The SEC decided to group all bonuses together;8 9 however,
shareholder understanding of bonuses would have been facilitated by
separately stating performance-based bonuses and non-performance-
based bonuses. Many shareholders prefer performance-based bonuses
over non-performance-based bonuses because performance sensitive
bonuses, similar to stock options, tie management's pay to their per-
formance aligning the interests of shareholders and management.
However, for the summary compensation table to be effective, it must
be concise. Shareholder understanding of the overall compensation
scheme is paramount to the understanding of one component of com-
pensation. Thus, the SEC made the correct choice. However, rather
than only disclosing specific information about the bonuses in the
compensation committee report, footnote disclosure of this informa-
tion to the summary table also should have been required in order to
further promote shareholder awareness.
2. Other Annual Compensation
As initially proposed, the rules required all additional forms of an-
nual cash and noncash compensation paid, awarded or earned from
company contributions to retirement plans to be reported in the
"other annual compensation" column.90 Under the final rules, this
provision covers only specified compensation items which are not
properly categorized as salary or bonus.91 The specific items the new
rule requires are: perquisites; payments to cover an executive's taxes;
above-market or preferential earnings on restricted stock, options,
SARs, or deferred compensation paid during the year or payable dur-
ing the year but deferred at the election of the executive; all earnings
paid, or payable but deferred at the election of the executive, on long-
term incentive plan compensation; and the difference between the fair
market value of a company's stock and the price paid by an executive
for that stock (preferential discounts on stock purchases). 92
Perquisites must be disclosed in the table only when their aggre-
gate value exceeds the lesser of either $50,000 or 10% of the execu-
tive's total salary and bonus.9 3 Narrative disclosure of the nature and
value of the perquisite is required for any particular perquisites valued
at more than 25% of the sum of all perquisites reported for that
executive.94
88. Id. See infra Part V. for a discussion of the board compensation committee
report.
89. Id. at 48,130-31.
90. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,856.
91. Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,146.
92. Id.; Instructions to Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at
48,146.
93. Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,146.
94. Instruction 1 to Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,146.
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As indicated above, earnings on deferred compensation, restricted
stock, options, and SARs are potentially subject to disclosure in the
"other annual compensation" column. The proposed rules would have
required disclosure of all interest on deferred compensation and all
dividends on restricted stock.95 Such an approach is flawed for several
reasons. First, if all interest on deferred compensation (or all divi-
dends on restricted stock) is reported, compensation will be over-
stated. Where an executive has voluntarily deferred a portion of
annual bonus or salary, the executive is effectively making a loan to
the company.9 6 This loan is financially equivalent to any other invest-
ment the executive could have made outside the company if he had
not deferred his bonus or salary. If the executive had made the "other
investment," interest earned on the investment would not be reported
as compensation by the company. Earnings on the deferred compensa-
tion are no different than the earnings on the "other investment."
Thus, interest paid or credited to the executive on the deferred
amount should not be viewed as compensation. If it is included, com-
pensation will be overstated. Including all interest earned on deferred
compensation leads to the additional problem of misleading intercom-
pany and intracompany comparisons. 97 If an executive has been de-
ferring compensation for a number of years, the amount of earnings
disclosed will not be fairly comparable with the disclosure of earnings
of an executive who does not defer pay or has only recently begun to
do so.9S
Another problem with the proposed rules requiring reporting of all
interest on deferred pay is that the Commission would, in effect, be
discouraging executives from deferring compensation.9 9 Companies
and their executives, seeking to prevent compensation from appearing
larger than it actually is, would try to minimize deferred compensa-
tion. This might prove to be detrimental to executives in the long-
term since compensation is often deferred for tax or retirement plan-
ning purposes.10 0 Thus, the rules as initially proposed would have in-
Dollar amounts assigned to perquisites and other personal benefits are calculated
on the basis of aggregate incremental cost to the company. Instruction 2 to Item
402(b)(2)(iii)(C) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,146.
95. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,857-58.
96. Comment Letter from Bruce Atwater, Chairman, Corporate Governance Task
Force, The Business Roundtable to Jobnathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission 8 (Aug. 27,1992)(on file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission)[hereinafter Business Roundtable Letter].
97. Id.
98. Comment Letter from Johnathan Silber, Chairman, Corporate and Securities
Law Committee, American Corporate Counsel Association to Johnathan G. Katz,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission 2 (Aug. 28,1992)(on file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission)[hereinafter ACCA Letter].
99. Id.
100. Id
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jected a bias against executives who defer compensation.
The final rules require above-market or preferential earnings on
restricted stock, options, SARs, or deferred compensation paid during
the year or payable during the year but deferred at the election of the
executive to be included as "other annual compensation." 10  This
change eliminates the potential problems discussed above. Disclosure
of the portion of interest which is above the market rate and the por-
tion of dividends which is preferential is necessary to prevent compa-
nies from disguising compensation as noncompensatory interest or
dividends. Interest is deemed to be above-market if the rate of inter-
est is in excess of 120% of the applicable federal long-term rate in ef-
fect at the time the interest rate was set.102 Dividends are preferential
only if they are earned at a more favorable rate than dividends on the
company's common stock.103
Another item included in the "other annual compensation" column
is earnings on long-term incentive plan (LTIP) compensation. 04 The
full amount of such earnings must be reported as compensation. The
full amount is included because, in contrast to earnings on deferred
compensation and restricted stock, earnings on long-term incentive
plan compensation do not represent payments for the company's use
of the executive's deferred funds.105
3. Restricted Stock Awards
A restricted stock award is a compensation device whereby a corpo-
ration issues shares of its stock to executives, generally at no cost, at
par value, or at some nominal cost, in connection with the perform-
ance of future services by the executive.106 The full market value of
restricted shares awarded to an executive in a given fiscal year under
restricted stock award must be reported in the appropriate column of
the summary compensation table. 07 Typically, these shares are sub-
101. Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,146.
Earnings on deferred compensation invested in third-party investment vehi-
cles, such as mutual funds, are not required to be reported regardless of the rate
of return. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,132 n.43.
102. Instruction 3 to Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,146.
Applicable federal long-term rate data are published monthly by the Internal
Revenue Service. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,132 n.45.
103. Instruction 4 to Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,146-
47.
104. Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,146.
105. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,132.
106. Henry C. Blackiston, III, Equity-Based Incentive Compensation in a Changing
Corporate Environment, in, COMPENSATION PLANNING FOR EXEcUTIVES IN A NEW
ENVIRONMENT, 329 PLI/Tax 235, 288-289 (July-Aug., 1992); Alan J. Hawksley &
Michael S. Melbinger, Rewarding Executives With Stock and Stock-Value Ar-
rangements, TAX'N FOR LAW., July/Aug. 1992, at 34, 36-38.
107. Item 402(b)(2)(iv) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,147.
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ject to forfeiture and are nontransferable until a specified period of
time has elapsed.10s However, during the restricted period, executives
are treated as the owners of the stock and thus possess all dividend
and voting rights connected with ownership.109
The SEC elected to require the full market value of the restricted
stock awards to be reported because of the stock's "minimal risk of
forfeiture and the concomitant likelihood of appreciation above the
grant-date market value."110 In other words, the SEC is requiring the
full market value of restricted stock awards to be included because the
recipient has close to full ownership of the stock.11 This approach
may mislead shareholders because such stock rarely has the same
value as freely transferable shares. An alternative to this approach
would be to require the company to discount the value of the shares to
market value to reflect the constraints on transferability.112 However,
restricted stock is difficult to value in such a manner. The concern
really should be which approach would be less misleading to share-
holders. Given the difficulty in discounting the value of restricted
stock, the minimal risk of forfeiture of such stock, and the relative
ease of calculating the full market value of the stock, the SEC's meth-
odology appears to be the more appropriate solution.
4. Option/SAR Grants
Generally speaking, an option is a right granted by the issuing cor-
poration to the executive allowing him to purchase a specified amount
of shares of the corporation's stock for a specified price.113 An SAR is
a contractual right to be paid an amount equal to the difference (or
appreciation) between the value of a share of a company's stock on the
date the SAR is granted and the value of the stock on the date the
SAR is exercised.114 Companies must disclose in the summary com-
pensation table the number of shares of options and/or stock apprecia-
tion rights (SARs) awarded.115 Only the number of shares of options
and/or SARs must be reported in the summary table. Options and
SARs are not valued in the summary table but are instead subject to
108. Blackiston, supra note 106, at 289.
109. Md
110. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,132. Where a restricted stock plan includes per-
formance-based conditions on vesting, the company may choose to treat these as
long-term incentive plan compensation. IH
111. Restricted stock recipients enjoy the stock ownership benefits of voting and divi-
dend rights. Hawksley & Melbinger, supra note 107, at 38.
112. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,132.
113. Blackiston, supra note 106, at 256.
114. Id at 310.
115. Item 402(b)(2)(iv)(B) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,147.
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disclosure in a separate table..16
5. LTIP Payouts
The SEC defines a long-term incentive plan ("LTIP") as any plan
providing compensation intended to serve as incentive for perform-
ance to occur over a period longer than one fiscal year, whether by
reference to the company's financial performance, stock price or other
measures, other than restricted stock, options, and SARs.117 Compa-
nies must disclose, in the summary table, the dollar value of cash or
stock-denominated awards actually realized or matured but deferred
at the election of the executive in each appropriate year.1 18
6. All Other Compensation
The "all other compensation" column is a catch-all category. In-
cluded in this category is any compensation not reported in the other
columns of the summary table (other than option and SAR exercises
and LTIP awards which are covered in other tables).119 An example
of an item included in this category is amounts paid, payable or ac-
crued under termination, severance and change-of-control arrange-
ments (e.g. golden parachutes).120
C. Other Criticisms/Potential Improvements
1. Bottom-Line Figure
It has been suggested that the summary table should include a
"bottom-line" figure representing the total value of all cash and non-
cash compensation received by each executive.' 2 ' Because the sum-
mary compensation table is probably the single most important part of
the disclosure scheme, and many shareholders are likely to focus
solely on this table, a bottom-line figure is potentially a serious omis-
sion. Is the Commission satisfying its goal of facilitating clear under-
standing? It is not if shareholders cannot answer the most basic
question of all-how much was an executive paid during the last
year?122
One reason why the Commission may have chosen not to require a
bottom-line figure is that reaching a truly accurate bottom-line figure
116. See infra subsection III.C.1. for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of such an approach.
117. Item 402(a)(6)(iii) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,145.
118. Item 402(b)(2)(iv)(C) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,147.
119. Item 402(b)(2)(v) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,147; Instruction 1 to Item
402(b)(2)(v) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,147.
120. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,133.
121. USA Letter, supra note 73, at 3.
122. Id. However, important information would be missed if a shareholder focused
exclusively on a bottom-line figure. Cf. supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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is arguably not possible because the present value of stock options can-
not be precisely determined. The SEC has chosen to require compa-
nies simply to disclose in the summary table the number of options or
SARs awarded. 3 Any monetary valuation of the grants is deferred
to the tables dealing specifically with them. Should the SEC never-
theless require companies to use option valuation models to provide
present values for option grants in the summary compensation table?
If the present value of options could be reliably ascertained, they
should be included in the table. That would make a bottom-line figure
possible. However, in light of the potential problems with such mod-
els,12 4 the SEC should not be criticized for its choice.
2. Exclusion of Option/SAR Information
Some commentators have argued that information regarding stock
options should not appear in the summary table at all.125 They argue
that the information regarding the options is not readily comparable
to other data in the table because it is impossible to understand the
value of a grant without knowing such details as exercise price and
vesting date. 2 6 Considering the SEC's goal of understandable disclo-
sure, this appears to be a valid argument. However, one must consider
the alternatives.
Would disclosure be more understandable if the number of options
and SARs Were totally excluded from the summary table? Probably
not. If some shareholders focus exclusively on the summary table, it
will appear that executives are receiving less than in fact they are.
Shareholders must be made aware that option grants also exist. The
column disclosing the number of shares of options and SARs awarded
does that. Narrative disclosure is not adequate because of the risk that
the information will not be read, and the new rules seek to avoid such
confusing narratives. Also, it cannot be assumed that unsophisticated
shareholders will look beyond the summary table to the option/SAR
tables to discover this information. 127
123. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
124. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the potential problems with option valuation
models.
125. ACCA Letter, supra note 98, at 1.
126. Id.
127. "A rational shareholder will expend the effort to make an informed decision only
if the expected benefits of doing so outweigh its costs. Given the length and com-
plexity of SEC disclosure documents, the opportunity costs are quite high and
very apparent. In contrast, the benefits aren't at all clear since most sharehold-
ers' holdings are too small to have any significant effect on the vote's outcome."
Bainbridge, supra note 37, at 22. Professor Bainbridge goes so far as to say that
most institutional investors choose to be passive investors due to high informa-
tion cost. IM
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
3. Disclosure Period
The final rules call for a three-year look-back period. This is in-
tended to show trends in the company's pay practices and to allow
shareholders to compare the company's trends to those of other com-
panies.128 A longer disclosure period would facilitate these goals by
making trends more apparent, making perhaps a five-year period pref-
erable. The added cost of such an approach could be alleviated by pro-
viding for a phase-in of such a requirement.129 Companies could be
required to provide the three-year disclosure for the first applicable
year, as is required under the rules as enacted. A four-year disclosure
period would be required in the second year and a five-year disclosure
period in the third year and beyond. Under this approach, companies
would simply retain information from the initial table until a full five
years are disclosed, but would not incur any additional costs to gather
the information. Although historical information is available in prior
public filings, the relatively low cost of providing this additional infor-
mation would be more than offset by the benefits provided to share-
holders who might not have ready access to the prior public filing.
IV. OPTION/SAR TABLES
The new rules require three tables dealing with options and SARs.
First, the rules prescribe a table including individual option and SAR
grants and related valuation information (Table B).130 Also required
is a table including aggregated exercise and year-end holdings value
information (Table C).131 Finally, a table disclosing option and SAR
repricings is required.1 3 2 Certain provisions of the individual grant
and related value table are discussed below.
The individual grant and related valuation table requires, with re-
spect to each grant, the name of the executive receiving the grant, the
number of options and SARs granted, the percent of the total options
and SARs granted to employees during the year that the grant to the
executive represents, the per-share exercise or base price of the op-
tions or SARs, and the expiration date of the options or SARs.133
128. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
129. Such a phase-in is allowed in other portions of the summary compensation table.
A phase-in is permitted for disclosure of the amounts reported in the "other an-
nual compensation" and "all other compensation" columns of the table. Also,
small business issuers are permitted to use a three-year phase-in for all columns
of the table. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,130.
130. Item 402(c) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,147-48.
131. Item 402(a) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,145.
132. Item 402(i) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,156.
133. Item 402(c)(2)(i)-(v) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,148. If the exercise or
base price is less than the market price of the underlying security on the date of
grant, a separate, adjoining column must be added showing the market price on
the date of grant. Id. at (iv).
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Repriced options or SARs must be reported as new grants.134 An op-
tion or SAR is "repriced" when the exercise price of the option or
SAR is lowered by the issuing company. Disclosure of performance
criteria and other material terms of the option or SAR is also man-
dated.135 A performance-based option or SAR is an option whose vest-
ing, exercisability or actual grant is keyed to the executive achieving
predetermined objectives.13 6
In addition to the individualized grant information listed above, the
rules require disclosure of either the potential realizable value of each
option/SAR grant or the present value of each such grant.13 7 The
company may choose the approach it prefers. In the proposed rules,
t 'he SEC mandated disclosure of data reflecting a range of potential
realizable values calculated on the basis of various assumed stock price
appreciation rates over a period of ten years.'3 8 The Commission's
proposal envisioned calculations based on arbitrarily determined ap-
preciation rates of 50%, 100%, and 200% for the ten-year period.139 No
provision was made for present value calculations.
The proposed rules were criticized for a number of reasons. For
example, it was argued that the percentages adopted could mislead
shareholders as to the range of probable stock price growth for most
companies.140 Stock price appreciation varies significantly depending
on a company's performance, the performance of the stock market in
general, and on industry-specific factors.141 Nevertheless, the pro-
posed rules dictated that all companies were to use the same percent-
ages. Interestingly, the Commission noted that, between 1925 and
1991, the average ten-year capital appreciation rate for the S&P 500
Stock Index was 70%.142 Yet, it proposed appreciation rates as high as
200%, an overly optimistic estimate for many companies.
The rules as proposed were also criticized for their assumption of a
ten-year option/SAR term. While many options/SARs have a ten
year life, other terms are used. Further, many option plans reduce the
term to a shorter period after an executive retires. 43 When the over-
statement of both appreciation rates and exercise period are com-
134. Instruction 2 to Item 402(c) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,148.
135. Instruction 3 to Item 402(c) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,148.
136. See Blackiston, supra note 106, at 279. An example of a performance-based op-
tion is an option which vests only when the corporation achieves a specified cu-
mulative earnings per share. Id.
137. Item 402(c)(2)(iv) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,148.
138. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,858-59.
139. Id.
140. NYSBA Letter, supra note 54, at 9; ABA Letter, supra note 76, at 30.
141. ABA Letter, supra note 76, at 30.
142. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,859 n.28 (citing R. IBBOTSON, STOCK, BONDS,
BILLS AND INFLATION YEARBOOK (1991)).
143. NYSBA Letter, supra note 54, at 9.
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bined, the proposed table would have been misleading to
shareholders.144
Some commentators suggested that the SEC require present valua-
tion of options and SARs, either in all cases or as an alternative to the
potential realizable value information.145 They argued that present
value calculations are recognized as valid and are generally relied on
in the market.146 The SEC partially acceded to these suggestions in
the final rules by allowing companies to select which of the two forms
of disclosure they prefer1 47
The SEC also revised its rules governing the potential realizable
value disclosure in response to the above mentioned criticism.148 If a
company chooses to utilize the potential realizable value approach, it
must report potential option/SAR gain values based on assumed an-
nual appreciation rates of 5% and 10% over the actual term of the op-
tion or SAR granted.149 Assuming a ten-year term and annual
compounding, a 5% assumed annual rate of appreciation would result
in total potential appreciation of 63%.150 Under the same assump-
tions, a 10% assumed annual rate of appreciation would result in total
potential appreciation of 159%.151 Merely providing for 63% and 159%
assumed appreciation may not adequately inform shareholders. A
preferable approach would be to provide a broader range of realistic
hypothetical rates.152 Increasing disclosure of the range of potential
results by adding columns for 3% and 7% assumed annual rates would
be less misleading to shareholders. Assuming a ten-year term and an-
nual compounding, 3% and 7% assumed rates of appreciation would
result in total potential appreciation of 34% and 97%, respectively. If a
broader range of rates is provided, shareholders would be less apt to
mistakenly believe the percentage growth figures are equivalent to
the company's internal projections for stock price growth. Further, to
the extent the SEC requires hypothetical appreciation based on per-
centages above what is reasonably expected, without a concomitant re-
quirement of disclosure based on rates lower than expected, the SEC
will be creating a bias against the use of options and SARs. Companies
144. Id
145. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,135.
146. Id
147. 1&
148. Id.
149. Item 402(c)(2)(vi)(A) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,135.
As an example of what the table would disclose, the SEC provided the follow-
ing: "the potential realizable values of an option for 1000 shares with an exercise
price of $10, and a five-year term would be reported as $2,763 (5%) and $6,105
(10%)." Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,135 n.80.
150. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,135.
151. IdH
152. The number of hypothetical rates disclosed must not be too large or the interests
of concise, understandable disclosure will suffer.
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may believe that shareholders will perceive such disclosure negatively
and as a result, use other compensation devices.
As mentioned above, the SEC decided to allow companies to report
grant-date option/SAR value information rather than potential value
information.153 Such present value information can be procured
through uniform option pricing methodologies. Option pricing models
determine present value based on company-specific parameters, and
thus, would arguably provide shareholders with more meaningful in-
formation about an option's incentive qualities than would the poten-
tial appreciation approach. 5 4 The modified Black-Scholes model is an
example of an option pricing model.155 If a company chooses to use
the grant-date valuation alternative, the disclosure must be footnoted
to describe the valuation method utilized.156
Many commentators argue that option valuation models do not ad-
equately value long-term options.' 57 Valuation of nontransferable
long-term options is even more questionable.15s The Black-Scholes
model is primarily designed to be used with short-term tradable op-
tions, not nontransferable long-term options.159 Further, using such a
model might lead a reader to believe that the amounts presented are
totally accurate when in fact they are not. In fact, commentators ar-
gue that the Black-Scholes formula is dependent on the user's views
on such matters as the company's future dividends and market inter-
153. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. The grant-date option/SAR value is a
present value figure while a potential value figure reflects the potential gain
value of the option/SAR based on hypothetical appreciation rates.
154. Id.
155. USA Letter, supra note 73, at 4.
156. Instruction 9 to Item 402(c) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,154. If the
company uses a variation of the Black-Scholes option pricing model, the descrip-
tion may be limited to a simple indication of the use of such pricing model. Id. If
another valuation method is used, the methodology as well as any material as-
sumptions must be described. IL
157. Comment Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission 23 (Aug. 11, 1992)(on file with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission)[hereinafter CSM Letter]; Business Roundtable
Letter, supra note 96, at 10.
158. Business Roundtable Letter, supra note 96, at 10.
159. 1d
The Black-Scholes option valuation model is not designed to accurately value
long-term, nontransferable executive options. CSM Letter, supra note 157, at 23-
24. The model values options based on a trader's ability to effect a dynamic arbi-
trage between the option and the underlying security on an ongoing basis. Id.
The value of an option is equal to its expected terminal value on the option expi-
ration date discounted at the risk-free rate. Id (citation omitted). The low dis-
count rate is only appropriate if the option trader can execute countervailing
transactions to the purchase or sale of the option. Id. An executive holding a
long-term, nontransferable stock option is not able to participate in such arbi-
trage activities because the option is not transferable and because the holder can-
not engage in countervailing transactions due to certain trading prohibitions. Id.
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est rates over the life of the option.160 The model's result might actu-
ally mislead shareholders since the disclosing company has discretion
over the variables and many shareholders are inexperienced with the
model.161
Neither reporting the grant-date option/SAR value nor reporting
potential option/SAR values is totally accurate. Further, each method
has advantages and disadvantages. Because both alternatives have
drawbacks, it is difficult to suggest that one alternative be mandated.
However, allowing a company to choose the method it prefers does
nothing to enhance inter-company comparability of executive option/
SAR grants. Shareholders unfamiliar with the new disclosure regime
are likely to be misled by the two divergent approaches to option/SAR
valuation when making comparisons among companies.
Companies are likely to report grant-date option/SAR value rather
than use the hypothetical appreciation rates. Using the grant-date val-
uation alternative will result in a lower dollar figure being disclosed to
shareholders. Grant-date valuation employs a present value determi-
nation while the hypothetical appreciation approach discloses poten-
tial future values. Because potential gain values based on assumed
rates of appreciation are not discounted to present value under the
SEC's approach, the future values will always exceed the present val-
ues. However, sophisticated shareholders, especially institutional in-
vestors, will understand that companies are taking such an approach
and weigh the disclosure accordingly.
Arguably, in the near future, some corporations may be hesitant to
use the grant-date alternative in light of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board's (FASB) current consideration of appropriate ac-
counting for stock options and similar awards.162 Such corporations
may be concerned that if they begin to consistently provide present
value information to shareholders, FASB may require that the pres-
ent value of options be charged to earnings. 163 This fear is countered
by the fear that other companies will make disclosure based on pres-
ent value, giving the appearance of a lower compensation scheme.
V. BOARD COMPENSATION COMMITTEE REPORT
The new rules require a report by the board compensation commit-
tee disclosing the company's compensation policies concerning its ex-
ecutive officers, including the specific relationship of corporate
performance to executive compensation. 164 Specific discussion is not
160. NYSBA Letter, supra note 54, at 8-9.
161. Id.
162. See Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,858 & n.27.
163. USA Letter, supra note 73, at 3.
164. Item 402(k)(1) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157.
"Boilerplate language" is to be avoided in describing the factors or criteria
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required with respect to each executive. Instead, a discussion is re-
quired with respect to the executive officers as a group.165 However,
the rules do require specific discussion of the CEO's compensation.
The committee's bases for the CEO's pay reported for the last com-
pleted year, including the factors and criteria upon which the CEO's
compensation was based, must be addressed.166 A specific discussion
of the relationship of the company's performance to the CEO's com-
pensation for the last completed year is also mandated.167 Both the
discussion concerning the CEO and the discussion regarding the other
named executives must include a description of each measure of the
company's performance, whether qualitative or quantitative, on which
compensation was based.168 Such performance measures might in-
clude sales, earnings, quality rate, return on assets or market share.16 9
The final rules provide that the disclosure is to be made "over the
name of each member of the [company's] compensation commit-
tee."170 However, the members do not have to sign the report.'71 If
the board of directors modified or rejected in any material way any
action or recommendation by the compensation committee, such infor-
mation, along with an explanation of the rationale for the action, must
be disclosed.172 This disclosure must be made over the names of all
members of the board, but the members do not have to sign the
report.173
The SEC has stated that the "disclosure of the Compensation Com-
mittee's policies will enhance shareholders' ability to assess how well
directors are representing their interests." 74 Thus, theoretically, the
underlying compensation packages. Instruction 1 to Item 402(k), supra note 2, at
48,157.
165. Item 402(k)(1) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157. See also Final Rules,
supra note 2, at 48,138.
166. Item 402(k)(2) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157.
167. Id.
168. Id.; Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,138.
169. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,868; Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,138.
170. Item 402(k)(3) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157. If a company does not
have a compensation committee, the names of the members of any committee
performing equivalent functions is to be included. If no such committee exists,
the names of each member of the board of directors is to be included. Id.
171. See infra notes 186-193 and accompanying text.
172. Item 402(k)(3) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157.
173. Id.
174. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,138. See also Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at
82,867; supra note 164 and accompanying text.
The report is "intended to bring shareholders into the compensation commit-
tee or board meeting room and permit them to see and understand the specific
decisions made through the eyes of the directors." Proposed Rules, supra note 1,
at 82,868.
At least one commentator has argued that this goal conflicts with state corpo-
rate law which provides for the division of authority between shareholders and
directors. Bainbridge, supra note 37, at 22. Professor Bainbridge predicts that
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report will help improve the accountability of directors to sharehold-
ers.175 The Commission believes that shareholders are entitled to
know the bases for directors' compensation decisions since it is the
shareholders who ultimately fund executive pay.176 With an en-
hanced understanding of the rationale for compensation practices, the
Commission expects that shareholders will be able to make an in-
formed decision when voting on directors or on executive and director
compensation plans.177
Several issues are raised regarding the compensation committee re-
port. An initial question is whether it is even possible to delineate the
specific factors upon which a compensation decision is based.178 In
this situation, the compensation committee is treated as a distinct en-
tity with an independent rationale for its decisions. The rules seem to
assume that each and every member of the committee used the same
factors or criteria in making compensation decisions. In contrast to
this assumption, the views of individual committee members are likely
to vary considerably.179 Any specific factor may be significant to one
member of the committee, but of little or no importance to other
members.180 Thus, the report may mislead shareholders as to exactly
on what the various committee members based their support for the
committee's decision.
From the foregoing discussion, one might argue that the SEC
should have required disclosure of each individual committee mem-
ber's reasons or motivations for supporting the committee's recom-
mendations. However, such an approach would have several
drawbacks. If discussions among committee members were to be sum-
marized in the report, open communication during committee meet-
ings might be hindered.181 This might lead to compensation awards
based on formulas alone without taking into consideration individual
performance. 8 2
The final rules allow a company to withhold target levels with re-
spect to specific performance-related factors or any factors involving
confidential information, if such disclosure would adversely affect the
company. 8 3 While this exception is necessary from a business stand-
point, the omission of this information could be misleading to readers
the side effects of the new rules will indirectly upset the division of authority
between the board and shareholders. Id.
175. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
176. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,867.
177. See Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,867.
178. CSM Letter, supra note 157, at 4.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,138; ACCA Letter, supra note 98, at 8.
182. Id.
183. Instruction 2 to Item 402(k) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157.
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because some of the factors which may have been used in compensa-
tion determinations will not be disclosed.184 Compensation decisions
may appear to be unjustified and thus would be misleading.185
The proposed rules required the individual committee members to
sign the committee report. 8 6 According to the Commission, the signa-
ture requirement was intended to increase the committee members'
focus on the specific disclosure obligation.187 Under the final rules,
the SEC changed its position and simply required the committee mem-
bers' names to be printed at the end of the report. 8 8 The Commission
stated that the signature requirement was deleted because the same
purpose could be accomplished, and the practical difficulties associ-
ated with obtaining manual signatures avoided, if the report were sim-
ply made over the names of the committee members.189 However, it is
more plausible that the Commission removed the requirement in re-
sponse to heavy criticism by commentators. Commentators criticized
the signature requirement for potentially creating a risk of increased
individual director liability.190 They questioned whether committee
members would have a special responsibility and, therefore, liability
for having signed the report.19' If there is a risk of increased liability,
either real or perceived, communication among directors will not be as
complete and open as possible. Further, individuals might have be-
come hesitant to serve as directors, to serve on compensation commit-
tees or to take an activist role in compensation matters.192 Committee
members may have increasingly consulted outside compensation ex-
perts in an effort to avoid personal liability from deficient
disclosure.93
In an effort to dissipate concerns over director liability, the SEC
further explained its position regarding the committee report. The
SEC stated that "[i]f shareholders are not satisfied with the decisions
reflected in the report, the proper response is the ballot, not resort to
the courts to challenge the disclosure."194 Additionally, the provisions
184. CSM Letter, supra note 157, at 34.
185. Id.
186. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,867.
187. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,139.
188. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
189. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,139.
190. See e.g., CSM Letter, supra note 157, at 5; NYSBA Letter, supra note 54, at 4.
191. See e.g., CSM Letter, supra note 157, at 5; NYSBA Letter, supra note 54, at 4.
192. CSM Letter, supra note 157, at 65.
193. Id. Use of outside compensation consultants may result in negative consequences
to shareholders. For example, because such experts are largely performing a
function which the compensation committee would have performed, costs to
shareholders are increased. It should be noted, however, that many large compa-
nies already employ such consultants. To the extent the consultants remain ob-
jective, shareholders should benefit from the consultant's analysis.
194. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,138.
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requiring the report were revised to provide that the disclosure will
not be deemed soliciting material, or to be filed under section 18 of the
Exchange Act.195 The compensation committee report is not ex-
empted from all shareholder litigation, however. Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 under the 1934 Act are still applicable because the SEC
cannot exempt parties from these provisions.
Some commentators questioned the Commission's authority to re-
quire a report signed by each member of a compensation commit-
tee.196 These parties believed that the Commission's requirement
constituted, or could evolve into, substantive regulation of corporate
conduct. 197 The commentators maintained that compensation deci-
sions are corporate actions and that the corporation should disclose
such decisions rather than board committees. 98 The Commission was
attempting to require a report not of the company, but of a committee
of the board normally comprised of outside directors.199 Such infor-
mation disclosure is a matter of state law, it was argued, and is beyond
the scope of the Commission. 20 ° The SEC responded by stating that
because disclosure of the committee's policies will enhance share-
holder's ability to assess how well directors are representing their in-
terests, the report is appropriate and necessary and within the
Commission's authority.201 Further, the SEC declared that the disclo-
sure would not impose new fiduciary standards on directors.202
VI. PERFORMANCE GRAPH
The new rules require companies to provide a line graph (Table E)
comparing the company's cumulative total shareholder return with a
performance indicator of the overall stock market. 203 The company's
195. Id; Item 402(a)(9) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2. The performance graph, dis-
cussed infra in Part VI., is treated similarly to the compensation committee re-
port. The rules specify that the compensation committee report and the
performance graph are required only in a proxy or information statement relat-
ing to an annual meeting of security holders at which directors are to be elected.
Item 402(a)(8) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2. Thus, this information is not
deemed to be incorporated by reference into any Securities Act or Exchange Act
filing, except to the extent that a company specifically incorporates it by refer-
ence. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,138.
196. ABA Letter, supra note 76, at 9; NYSBA Letter, supra note 54, at 16.
197. ABA Letter, supra note 76, at 9; NYSBA Letter, supra note 54, at 16.
198. ABA Letter, supra note 76, at 9.
199. Id.
200. NVYSBA Letter, supra note 54, at 16.
201. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,138.
202. Id
203. Id. at 48,139. To facilitate inter-company comparisons, total return must be
presented on a dividend-reinvested basis. Item 402(l)(1) of Regulation S-K, supra
note 2, at 48,157. Companies must assume that dividends are reinvested into addi-
tional shares of the same class of stock. Instruction 1 to Item 402(1) of Regulation
S-K, supra note 2, at 48,158. Without such a requirement, companies that have
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total return must also be compared with the cumulative total return of
either a published industry or line-of-business index or a company-
determined peer group selected in good faith.204 Alternatively, the
comparison may be made to issuers with similar market capitaliza-
tions, but only if the company does not use a published industry or
line-of-business index and does not believe it can reasonably identify a
peer group.205
The performance presentation is designed to complement the com-
pensation committee's discussion of the relationship of executive pay
to corporate performance.20 6 Therefore, the graph is expected to aid
shareholders in analyzing corporate performance and its relationship
to the company's compensation policies.
An example of a performance indicator of the overall stock market
is the S&P 500,207 although other broad market indices exist. Compa-
nies that are not included in the S&P 500 are allowed to use a different
broad equity market index that includes companies that trade on the
same exchange or NASDAQ market or are of comparable market cap-
italization.208 If the company is included in the S&P 500, the company
must use that index.2 09 A published index is any index which was
prepared by a party other than the company or an affiliate and is ac-
cessible to the company's shareholders. 210 If a peer group is used, the
company has broad discretion in determining its peer comparison. 211
elected to pass excess cash flow through to investors would appear to have a sig-
nificantly lower return. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,139.
Disclosure is required for the preceding five year period, although the com-
pany may disclose for a longer period. Instruction 3 to Item 402(1) of Regulation
S-K, supra note 2, at 48,158.
204. Item 402(l)(1)(ii)(A) and (B) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157. If the
company does not select its peer group on an industry or line-of-business basis,
the company must disclose the basis for its selection. Id.
205. Item 402(l)(1)(ii)(C) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157. See infra note 214
and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale for this provision.
206. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 82,868. See infra Part V for a discussion of the
compensation committee report.
207. The S&P 500 is an unmanaged index of the common stock prices of 500 well-
known multinational corporations covering more than 30 different industries.
S&P 500 returns include reinvestment of dividends.
208. Item 402(l)(1)(i) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157. Other indices include
the S&P 500 Composite Index, the Dow Jones Equity Market Index, the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange Market Value Index, the Wilshire 5000 Equity Index, and
the Russell 1000, 2000, or 3000. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,139 n.112.
209. Item 402(l)(1)(i) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157. Intercompany com-
parisons will be enhanced by this requirement. Final Rules, supra note 2, at
48,139 n.112.
210. Item 402(l)(3) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157. A company may, how-
ever, use an index prepared by the company or affiliate if such index is widely
recognized and used. Id
211. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,139.
This broad discretion in determining peer groups could translate into compa-
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The comparison may be made to one or a number of other compa-
nies.21 2 Further, bases other than industry or line-of-business may be
used for determining peer comparisons as long as the bases are dis-
closed.213 The provision allowing companies that do not believe it is
possible to provide a peer comparison to disclose this belief and com-
pare their shareholder return to one or more companies selected on
the basis of similar market capitalization was included in the final
rules for the benefit of companies whose peers are privately-held com-
panies or subsidiaries or divisions of larger publicly-held companies. 2 14
This provision is also applicable to diversified companies that do not
readily fit into a standard industry category and do not have a peer
group.
One general criticism of the performance graph is the possible im-
plication that company performance should be the only factor consid-
ered in determining executive compensation.215 Arguably, such a
determination should be left to a company's compensation committee
and ultimately, to its shareholders.2 1 6 On the other hand, if a com-
pany does use some measure of financial performance to determine
the compensation of its executives, the performance graph would be
appropriate.2 1 7 Regardless of the factors weighed in determining com-
pensation, the new rules require a board compensation committee re-
port disclosing the directors' discussion and analysis of the
relationship, if any, between corporate performance and executive
compensation.218 The committee report specifically describes the ac-
tual link between company performance and executive compensation.
The performance graph, in contrast, simply compares the company's
shareholder return with various performance indicators external to
the company. If shareholders believe executives are being overpaid in
light of company performance, they should focus their attention on
the committee report. Thus, while the SEC required the performance
graph to complement the discussion by the compensation committee
of the relationship of executive compensation to corporate perform-
nies choosing peers with below-average returns. The SEC could attack such an
approach based on the "good faith" requirement. See supra note 204 and accom-
panying text. There is also potential 10b-5 or 14a-9 liability if the company's
choice renders the disclosure misleading. Once the index is selected, however,
any change from that index requires an explanation for the change. Item
402(l)(4) of Regulation S-K, supra note 2, at 48,157. Further, the company's total
return must be compared with both the new index and the index used in the
previous year. I&
212. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,139.
213. Id
214. Final Rules, supra note 2, at 48,139-40.
215. See ACCA Letter, supra note 98, at 3.
216. Id
217. See Id. at 4.
218. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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ance, the graph may actually mislead shareholders and detract from
the committee report. The SEC's decision to include the performance
graph in its new disclosure scheme was probably ill-advised.
The performance graph can also be criticized for implying that
companies evaluate performance by "total return."2 19 Many other in-
dices of performance are available and used.220 However, the SEC's
decision to focus on a single standard for evaluating performance fur-
thers the goal of providing concise and understandable disclosure. An-
other criticism of the graph is that it encourages management to focus
on short-term objectives such as bolstering the year-end stock price.22 1
Such an approach may prove detrimental to shareholders interested in
long-term growth and value. Further, short-term fluctuations in a
company's stock price caused by factors not directly related to the
company, such as macro-economic or industry conditions, may mislead
shareholders.222
VII. CONCLUSION
Small, unsophisticated investors (and some sophisticated investors)
were unable to understand the disjointed, legalistic narratives pro-
duced under the former disclosure rules. The new rules will make
disclosure more understandable and more concise, thus achieving the
SEC's stated purpose.223
The new disclosure scheme will reduce shareholders' costs of mak-
ing informed decisions regarding executive compensation because
compensation information will be easier to understand and relatively
concisely displayed. Whether the benefits of making an informed de-
cision will outweigh the remaining costs is yet to be seen. Sharehold-
ers with a small ownership interest are still not likely to profit from
an increased role in compensation decisions. Such shareholders are
rationally apathetic. The cost of becoming informed is greater than
any benefit received. Many of these investors will "free-ride" on the
efforts of other investors who are willing to expend the resources to
analyze the compensation information.
Institutional investors already had access to much of the informa-
tion provided under the new rules thr6ugh the narrative disclosure
219. Comment Letter from Karl R. Barnickel, Chairman, Securities Law Committee,
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. to Jonathon G. Katz, Secretary
Securities and Exchange Commission 4 (Aug. 29, 1992)(on file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission).
220. Id- Examples of other indices include Return on Equity, Return on Assets, and
Growth in Earnings Per Share.
221. Id. at 3. This argument assumes an inefficient market.
222. See ABA Letter, supra note 76, at 43. However, presumably all companies would
be affected by such changes.
223. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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provided under the old rules, other public filings, and various financial
statements. However, rather than engaging in the costly and time
consuming task of assessing and evaluating various compensation
schemes themselves, institutional investors may now rely on the com-
pany to do much of the work for them. Further, many institutional
investors hold large enough interests in company equity to profit from
increased participation in compensation decisions.
If enough shareholders will benefit from taking an active role in
compensation decisionmaking, the SEC is well on its way toward
achieving its initiative of enhancing the workings of market forces
with respect to executive pay.
